Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 10

Issue 3

Article 2

1-1-2015

The Anti-Clone Wars: Towards a Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of
Patent Misuse and the Per Se Illegality of Anti-Cloning Provisions
Patrick Holvey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Computer Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patrick Holvey, The Anti-Clone Wars: Towards a Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of Patent Misuse and the
Per Se Illegality of Anti-Cloning Provisions, 10 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 153 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol10/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts by an authorized
editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 3 WINTER 2015

THE ANTI-CLONE WARS: TOWARDS A REINVIGORATION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF PATENT MISUSE AND THE PER SE
ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS
Patrick Holvey*
© Patrick Holvey

Cite as: 10 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 153 (2015)
http://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1433

ABSTRACT
Patent misuse, a once-valuable doctrine used to remove
anticompetitive actions enabled by patent grants from the
marketplace, has been relatively disfavored by the courts
for some time. Recent licensing practices by certain major
players within the high-technology marketplace, however,
provide an excellent opportunity for the doctrine to be
reinvigorated and applied. Apple, Inc., through its attempts
to prevent competitors from “cloning” its products, has
become an anticompetitive force that appears to have
impermissibly leveraged its patent portfolio in order to
extract contractual protections of non-patented subject
matter through “anti-cloning” provisions, improperly
broadening the scope of its patent grants. This Article
argues that this improper broadening of the patent grant
constrains competition in unpatented subject matter, harms
competition, and should be considered by the courts to
constitute per se patent misuse or, in the alternative, patent
misuse under a rule of reason analysis. As a result, Apple’s
*
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patents that are tainted by the anti-cloning provision’s
misuse should be held to be unenforceable at least as long
as agreements that contain the offending provision are still
in force.
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INTRODUCTION
As perhaps the most notable conflict in the so-called
“technology patent wars,”1 the “smartphone wars” continue to rage
on. The battlefield is comprised of multiple smartphone
manufacturers attempting to leverage various intellectual property
protections and regimes against their competitors through litigation
and trade complaints. Both the ultimate outcome of the smartphone
wars and how the individual skirmishes play out in front of the
court of public opinion will have lasting effects on the wider
struggle over whether stronger or more restricted intellectual
property regimes should be adopted to serve the economies of the
present and future.
The results of smartphone skirmishes can be evaluated for
clues as to developing trends in patent litigation, licensing, and
settlements. This Article will examine a settlement license clause
that has troubling implications for innovation not only in
smartphones but also in software and industrial design in general:
“anti-cloning provisions.” These provisions prohibit patent
licensees from practicing licensed patents in ways that produce
“clones” that are identical or substantially similar copies of
products or functions. This work will argue that Apple’s decision
to require Microsoft and HTC to acquiesce to anti-cloning
provisions in the Apple/Microsoft and Apple/HTC settlement
agreements sets a dangerous precedent for future patent licenses or
settlement agreements and should be found to be per se illegal
1

Richard Waters, Google Catches Up in Technology Patent Wars, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2014, at COMPANIES 18 (discussing the “smartphone
industry’s patent wars” within the “intellectual property arms race”).
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under the doctrine of patent misuse. As such, this Article will
argue that that this pattern of misuse, especially given Apple’s
demands for the inclusion of such a provision in any settlement
with Samsung, should result in a finding of patent misuse in future
litigation and provide an affirmative defense to any allegation of
infringement.
Part I will set out the background of the smartphone wars;
discuss cross-licensing as a potential tool to bring about settlement;
and conclude with an analysis of the anti-cloning provisions, their
conceptual framework, and recent examples of these provisions in
agreements to which the public has access. Part II will delve into
an analysis of misuse, beginning with patent misuse, continuing
with copyright misuse, later focusing on the restraints on the
misuse doctrine and the differences between the two regimes’
doctrines, and concluding with a look at the intersection of
antitrust and the misuse doctrine. Part III lays out the present
work’s central argument: anti-cloning provisions should be per se
illegal under the doctrine of patent misuse because they
impermissibly extend the patent grant and are unacceptably
anticompetitive.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ANTI-CLONING WARS
A. A Brief Summary of the Smartphone Wars and their Casualties
As one of the main battlefronts in the ongoing technology
patent wars, the smartphone wars continually dominate mainstream
media attention, particularly in technology-oriented reporting.
They command attention as a result of not only the major players
in the continual offensive, of which notable names include Google,
Apple, Samsung, Sony, Microsoft, Nokia, Motorola, and HTC, but
also the huge sums of money demanded and awarded. Indeed,
some award amounts are larger than the nominal gross domestic
product of small sovereign nations.2
2

Compare Field Listing: GDP, World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2015), with CHRIS BARRY ET AL.,
2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 8 (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
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Beginning in earnest in 2009 with Nokia’s infringement suit3
and International Trade Commission (ITC) complaint4 against
Apple, the smartphone wars have comprised of more than 50 suits;
countersuits; and ITC complaints involving well over 200 patents,
thousands of patent acquisitions between various parties, and
massive settlement agreements and verdicts.5 Of course, every
litigation carries potential risks for both sides: the patentee risks a
finding of invalidity, instantly rendering a perceived asset
worthless, while the alleged infringer risks a finding of
infringement, becoming suddenly responsible for unanticipated
damages and forced to the bargaining table in an extremely
disadvantageous position.
Because of this, it is not uncommon for patent litigants to
attempt to find common ground in settlement agreements. An
extensively utilized tool in high-tech patent settlements (and patent
settlements in general) is cross-licensing, wherein the parties agree
to trade intellectual property for intellectual property (among other
covenants) and each party walks away from the table with
additional freedom to operate and fewer litigation concerns.
As such, many of these litigations have concluded with
settlement agreements, notably the litigations involving
Apple/Nokia (in favor of Nokia), Apple/HTC (in favor of Apple),
and Nokia/HTC (in favor of Nokia).6 Virtually no public
information regarding the Apple/Nokia or Nokia/HTC agreements
is available (and will not be a focus of this work), but a redacted
forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (showing,
specifically, that the top award listed in Chart 2c is larger than the GDP of 33
sovereign nations according to the CIA World Factbook ranking).
3
Nokia Sues Apple over iPhone’s Use of Patented Wireless Standards,
APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 22, 2009, 11:20 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/
09/10/22/nokia_sues_apple_over_iphones_use_of_patented_wireless_standards.
html.
4
Chris Foresman, Nokia Hurls New Salvo in Spat with Apple, Complains
to ITC, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 29, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://arstechnica.com/apple/
2009/12/nokia-hurls-new-salvo-in-spat-with-apple-complains-to-itc/.
5
Smartphone Patent Wars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=Smartphone_patent_wars&oldid=605528380 (last visited Feb.
25, 2015).
6
Id.
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version of the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement sheds some light
on the current state of smartphone licensing agreements.7 One
notable aspect of the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement is a
relatively novel so-called “anti-cloning” provision.8 During an
extensive search of available public sources, very few references to
such provisions appear to exist, with almost all of them focused on
the Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement9 or the Apple/Microsoft
1997 settlement agreement.10
1. Apple/Samsung
Presently, Apple is deeply involved in litigation with Samsung
over a number of smartphone patents.11 According to reports and
filings, Apple has predicated any settlement agreement upon
Samsung’s acquiescence to an anti-cloning provision that is likely
very similar to the one found in the Apple/HTC Settlement
Agreement.12 A question that needs to be asked is whether Apple’s
7

Patent License and Settlement Agreement between HTC America, Inc.,
HTC Corp., and S3 Graphics Co., Ltd.; and Apple Inc. (Nov. 11, 2012),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/115711499/apple-htc-settlement-redacted
[hereinafter Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement].
8
Id. at Exhibit A “Requirements for Cloned Product” [hereinafter
Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision]; see also Florian Mueller, HTC Agreed Not
to ‘Clone’ Apple’s Products, but the Pinch-to-Zoom Gesture is Licensed, FOSS
PATENTS (Dec. 6, 2012, 7:07 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/12/htcagreed-not-to-clone-apples-products.html (characterizing the “Requirements for
Cloned Product” as an “anti-cloning provision”).
9
Mueller, supra note 8.
10
Patent Cross License Agreement Between Apple Computer, Inc. and
Microsoft Corporation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 5,
1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/584.pdf [hereinafter Apple/
Microsoft Agreement]; see also Matt Macari, Apple and Microsoft CrossLicense Deal Includes ‘Anti-Cloning’ Protections Going Back to 1997, THE
VERGE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/13/3239977/appleand-microsoft-cross-license-agreement-includes-anti-cloning.
11
Apple Sues Samsung for $2bn as Tech Rivals Head Back to Court, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/
31/apple-sues-samsung-for-2bn?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.
12
Florian Mueller, Apple Insists on Anti-Cloning Provision as Part of Any
Patent Settlement with Samsung, FOSS PATENTS (Jan. 20, 2014, 4:42 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/apple-insists-on-anti-cloning-
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insistence on such a provision constitutes an attempt by Apple to
inappropriately leverage its patent monopoly power to expand the
scope of its patent rights to cover subject matter outside of the
statutory grant.
B. Anti-Cloning Provisions
During settlement negotiations and in settlement agreements,
each party seeks to maximize its own profit and position and is
loath to empower its competition to easily compete directly with
itself, especially in the fast-moving and consumer preferencedriven retail electronics market. As such, certain iconic
corporations, namely Apple, have attempted to protect what they
consider to be a “distinctive user experience,”13 a nebulous term
that attempts to capture aspects of the corporation’s products and
innovations that do not otherwise qualify for protection within the
intellectual property regimes and protect those aspects from being
copied by Apple’s competitors. This protection is sought through
the use of anti-cloning provisions, which essentially forbid a
“substantially similar” user experience to result from the use of any
licensed patents or intellectual property. Apple, in particular,
appears to believe that it requires this contractual protection
because it finds the current intellectual property regimes
inadequate in capturing and protecting what it appears to consider
one of its most valuable assets: the look and feel of its products.

provision.html (“In a sworn declaration of January 16, 2014, Apple’s BJ
Watrous, Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, told the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California that Apple’s
‘discussions with Samsung have consistently included limits to both the scope of
any license and a prohibition against cloning Apple products.’ On that basis,
Apple’s lawyers wrote on the same day: ‘Samsung incorrectly claims [in its
opposition to Apple’s motion] that Apple made recent offers to Samsung
without anti-cloning provisions. Every offer Apple made to Samsung has
included limits to both the scope of any license and a prohibition against cloning
Apple products.’”).
13
See, e.g., Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8, at clause 1.
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1. Conceptual Framework of the Provisions
At the center of anti-cloning provisions is the idea that the user
experience, fostered by a particular innovation or set of
innovations, lends economic value to a product on the market.
Generally, this premise can be accepted as true, given past studies
on the effects of brand loyalty and marketing in general and, more
specifically, discussions on the unique user experience and user
loyalty exhibited by users of Apple products.14
On this point, Apple does have a potentially valid concern if its
goal is to protect the totality of a user’s experience from
duplication. In brief, the main intellectual property regimes are
patent (both utility and design), copyright, trademark, trade dress,
and trade secret.15 Each of these protections can cover various
aspects of an abstract operating system. Copyright will protect the
source and object code from wholesale copying and will also cover
the expressive elements of the operating system, such as the icons,
system animations, system sounds, etc.16 Copyright will generally
not, however, serve to cover any functional or architectural aspects
of the operating system.17 Patent law will serve to protect those
functional aspects of the operating system that are novel and
inventive.18 Here, however, the burden is high, and many aspects
of operating system behaviors that make up the totality of the user
experience will not qualify for protection under the patent
regime.19
Trade secret is of little use to the operating system if the system
is designed for retail use, as the “secrets” contained in the object or
source code will be placed into the hands of consumers. With the
proliferation of app developers (which strengthen any operating
system’s ecosystem and make it more attractive), the need for the
14

See, e.g., Ben Thompson, Apple and the Innovator’s Dilemma,
STRATECHERY (Dec. 9, 2010), http://stratechery.com/2010/apple-innovatorsdilemma/.
15
1 HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §§ 1:1, 2:1,
3:1, 4:1 (updated Mar. 2015).
16
Id. § 4:2, n.2.
17
Id. § 4:18, n.7.
18
Id. § 1:10, n.1.
19
Id. at n.2.
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general public to have and understand the inner workings of the
development platform effectively negates the trade secret regime
absent licensing terms imposing duties of secrecy upon users and
developers (terms that do not currently exist in either end user or
developer license agreements).20 And trademark law will only
prevent other operating systems from confusing the public as to
which company’s operating system it uses.21
Of the existing intellectual property regimes, trade dress may
be the only one that has the potential to afford Apple the ability to
protect its “distinctive user experience.” Trade dress refers
generally to a clearly articulated design or combination of elements
that is either inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning; is not functional; and serves to
identify a source, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection.22 In
examining whether trade dress covers Apple’s user experience, we
may assume that their user experience is distinctive and even
serves to identify Apple as a source.23 The crucial question is
20

Id. § 2:2-3; iOS Developer Program License Agreement, TOR BUG
TRACKER & WIKI, available at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/rawattachment/ticket/6540/ios_program_standard_agreement_20130610.pdf; iOS
8.1 End User License Agreement, TOR BUG TRACKER & WIKI, available at
https://ssl.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS81.pdf.
21
HOLMES, supra note 15, § 3:1, at n.5.
22
1 J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 8:1 (4th ed. 2014).
23
The author believes the experience to be distinctive but leaves aside
whether a customer or user’s experience with a product or service alone is
sufficient to identify a source. In examining this issue, courts will likely be hardpressed to avoid conflating user experiences with the first impressions a user
may have when comparing two products or services but should make every
effort to do so. For example, a customer walking into two taco shops may find
the décor to be very similar. This similarity in décor may constitute a violation
of the Lanham Act. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
But how a product or service looks does not wholly define the user experience,
although, admittedly, it may contribute to it. The customer may be greeted at
one restaurant with a festive, signature welcome that all the front staff join in on
and may be provided free tortilla chips and salsa upon seating while the other
restaurant is more muted, albeit still polite, in its greeting and fails to provide
chips and salsa for free. The impression an objective person may have looking at
two photographs of the restaurants may indeed lead that observer to conclude
that the appearances are likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the
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whether the constituent elements of Apple’s products that provide
this distinctive user experience are functional. If they are, then
trade dress (and trademark) protection is not available.24 If they are
non-functional, then it is likely that Apple may find protection
from clones in trade dress.
Before addressing whether or not the constituent elements that
comprise the distinctive user experience may or may not qualify
for protection as trade dress, it is important to note that neither
outcome affects whether or not Apple’s inclusion of these elements
in the anti-cloning provision of the patent licensing agreement
constitutes patent misuse. If trade dress protection is available then
the elements are necessarily non-functional and their inclusion
must improperly expand the patent grant through their inclusion.
But if, due to the elements’ functionality, trade dress protection is
not available, then their inclusion must also improperly expand the
patent grant by leveraging the grant to protect non-patented
functional elements from infringement. Indeed, the functionality
doctrine of trade dress law exists to ensure that de jure functional
trade dress is not monopolized to ensure competitive fairness, the
same end goal of the doctrine of patent misuse.25 In short, the legal
restaurants’ goods or services. However, an objective person experiencing the
two restaurants’ respective offerings will not necessarily find such confusion to
exist. Indeed, the disparate treatment offered by each restaurant may clearly
identify each one to the customer. On the other hand, it may also be taken as a
particular “play” on a standard motif that, while perhaps adding to or subtracting
from the enjoyment of the experience, does not actually serve as identification.
In applying this type of analysis to software and/or device users, courts should
face an additional challenge in determining what skill level consumers are
expected to have with regard to software as it pertains to their experience using
the software and their sophistication in being able to tell two similar products
apart from each other. In determining whether consumer experiences, as
opposed to first impressions, are likely to cause confusion about source, courts
will need to dig deeper than comparing pictures in exhibits and take steps to
compare the distinctive experiences that some litigants claim.
24
HOLMES, supra note 15, § 3:15.
25
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“Rather, de jure functionality rests on utility, which is determined in light
of superiority of design, and rests upon the foundation [of] . . . effective
competition.” (citing In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (internal quotations omitted)).
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status of the constituent elements not protected by the patent grant
has no effect in the patent misuse analysis that follows in Part III
Turning back to the applicability of trade dress as a suitable
form of protection for Apple’s distinctive user experience, briefly,
the question is whether the user experience, in whatever form it
takes, is functional. As seen in the Apple/HTC licensing agreement
(see infra Part I.B.2.b.), Apple’s definition of a cloned feature of
the distinctive user experience requires the feature to literally
infringe a licensed patent. Because utility patents are at least strong
evidence of a feature’s functionality,26 cloned features in their
entirety should not be covered by trade dress since they necessarily
would contain practiced utility patents. The question then becomes
whether the non-functional visual appearance of the cloned feature
is eligible for trade dress protection. On this point, there is
currently a fair bit of contention and a lack of clarity. On the one
hand, courts have previously refused to find the look and feel of a
computer program or the appearance of video monitors and
keyboards to be eligible for trade dress protection.27 On the other
hand, some courts have indicated that the look and feel of a
website may fall within the protections that trade dress provides.28
26

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001)
(“A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to the
statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise
by the party seeking trade dress protection. Where the expired patent claimed
the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must
carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional, for instance
by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device.”).
27
Digital Equipment Corp. v. C. Itoh & Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 598 (D.N.J.
1985) (holding that the layout of keys and set-up screen and general appearance
of video monitor are functional, while the shape and color of keyboard and
monitor are nonfunctional but have acquired no secondary meaning); see
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.
La. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, remanded, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that the “look and feel” of a computer program is not protectable
trade dress).
28
Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1248 (W.D. Wash.
2007); see also Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. Civ.
3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (denying
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These courts, however, have been unable to provide a more
thorough analysis on the subject due to settlements prior to
reaching the merits of such claims. Thus, the issue remains
unaddressed and ripe for more thorough consideration by the
judiciary and academics.
In any event, the above discussion shows the fractious nature
of the protection provided by the various intellectual property
regimes and the need to incorporate multiple protections into any
intellectual property strategy. While there was vigorous debate in
the mid-1990s regarding developing a sui generis protection for
software29 that would be similar to the sui generis protection of
semiconductors that had recently been enacted,30 the lack of an
agreed-upon framework for protection and the presence of
protection, although a patchwork, through the existing intellectual
property regimes inhibited the adoption of such protections. Given
the importance of building and maintaining a unique user
experience, it makes sense from a business perspective that
companies reliant on such distinctive features would endeavor to
protect their user experience from being duplicated. To a great
extent, the intellectual property regime framework provides for
such protection through the use of utility and design patents,
copyright, trademark, trade dress, and trade secret protections.
Indeed, some industry leaders believe that, while difficult and
costly to achieve, the “total user experience” can be fully protected
within traditional intellectual property regimes through a divideand-conquer approach.31
summary judgment, stating “protection of the ‘look and feel’ of a website
remains unclear”).
29
See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., Symposium: Toward a Third
Intellectual Property Paradigm: A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2327 (1994) (arguing that
computer “programs are machines that happen to have been constructed in the
medium of text” and, as such, differ from other kinds of machines or textual
works for purposes of intellectual property protection).
30
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14
(2014).
31
Charles Mauro, Apple v. Samsung: Impact and Implications for
Product Design, User Interface Design (UX), Software Development and
the Future of High-Technology Consumer Products, M AURO N EW M EDIA
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While Apple has adopted this approach to some degree, it has
also chosen to buttress its intellectual property protection with
contractual and licensing safeguards that essentially prohibit the
development or production of a product that is substantially similar
to one produced by Apple that practices any licensed patent in any
respect. Two examples of such provisions are provided below.
2. Recent Examples of these Provisions
The first relevant example of this provision, the 1997
Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement, set forth the relevant anticloning language within the definitional section. Only the relevant
definitions are presented below. The second, the Apple/HTC
settlement agreement, set forth the relevant anti-cloning language
in a separate Exhibit, “Requirements for Cloned Product,” which is
presented in its entirety below.
a. Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement
In relevant part, the Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement
states:
1.6
“Licensed Products” shall mean (i) any and
all process or activities performed by a party and
(ii) any and all machines, articles of manufacture,
compositions of matter and any other products
which are designed, developed, duplicated,
manufactured, acquired or rendered by or for a
party and which are transferred by or made
available from a party. Licensed Products shall
include, without limitation, Licensed Programs, but
shall exclude Clone Products or Foundry Products.
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.mauronewmedia.com/blog/apple-v-samsungimplications-for-product-design-user-interface-ux-design-software-development
-and-the-future-of-high-technology-consumer-products/ (“IP practitioners
should make use of all available forms of IP protection including design
patents, utility patents, copyright, trademark and in litigation, trade
dress, to create an interlocking set of protections that cover the look, feel
and function of [clients’] products and services.”).
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“Clone Product” shall mean:
1.14.1 With the exceptions listed in this section 1.14
below, a new product designed or acquired after the
Effective Date (“New Product”) of one of the
Parties that is primarily designed to be and is an
identical or substantially identical replacement in
functionality and/or user experience of a thenexisting Commercialized Product of the other party
(“Prior Product”) by (i) in the case of a Program,
providing all or substantially all of the user
commands and/or all or substantially all of the
programming interface(s) as the Prior Product or
(ii) in the case of a product which is not a Program,
providing the same or substantially the same
physical form or appearance to the user and
electronic and/or mechanical design as the Prior
Product.
1.14.12 To the extent that the Parties independently
develop new products, without prior detailed
knowledge of each others’ products, and such
products were both substantially developed prior to
the disclosure or release of either of the products,
then neither products shall be considered to be a
Clone Product of the other.
1.14.3 To the extent that a New Product of a Party
implements functionality that any party, including a
third party, rightfully and with proper authority (i)
licenses as an industry standard, or (ii) otherwise
makes available for general use by the industry, the
above functionality shall not be considered a factor
in the determination of whether such a New Product
is a Clone Product.
1.14.4 To the extent that a New Product of a Party
implements functionality that is required for the
New Product to interoperate or be compatible with
(but not replace) the Prior Product, the above
functionality shall not be considered a factor in the
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determination of whether such New Product is a
Clone Product.
1.14.5 Notwithstanding anything herein to the
contrary, the Parties agree that none of the
Commercialized Products existing as of the
Effective Date are Clone Products.32
b. Apple/HTC settlement agreement
In relevant part, the Apple/HTC settlement agreement states:
Requirements for Cloned Product
Each of the following requirements must be
satisfied in order for a particular HTC Android
Mobile Communication Device to be considered a
“Cloned Product” for the purposes of Article 12
Subject to any HTC defenses, APPLE demonstrates
that one or more valid claims of its covered Patents
(a) is literally infringed by a significant feature of
the human interface that has a distinctive visual
appearance of an HTC Android Mobile
Communications Device; (b) the same patent is also
literally practiced by a significant feature of the
human interface of an APPLE Mobile
Communication Device that has a distinctive visual
appearance, and (c) that the non-functional
distinctive visual appearance of such feature in the
HTC
Mobile Communications
Device
is
substantially similar to that in the APPLE Mobile
Communications Device, it being understood
however that such features will also include
functional aspects (collective, “Distinctive Apple
User Experience”), where such substantial
similarity demonstrates copying (but without
requiring proof of intent). Such substantially similar
32

Apple/Microsoft Agreement, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
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distinctive visual appearance of the feature in the
HTC Mobile Communications Device is referred to
herein as the “Cloned Feature”. For Example, a
specific graphical slider animation used in a
APPLE Mobile Communication Devices at the
bottom of a display screen to implement a “slide to
unlock” feature could qualify as a distinctive Apple
User Experience, however, a different animation
(for example a bubble slider) or an animation at
another location (for example along the side of a
screen) would not be considered substantially
similar and would not constitute a Cloned Feature.
Functionality and related methods (for example,
“pinch to zoom” functionality) will not be
considered a Distinctive Apple User Experience.
The Distinctive Apple User Experience (a) was first
developed and introduced by APPLE as part of an
APPLE Mobile Communication Device prior to
introduction of such feature or substantially similar
feature by HTC or any Third Party; (a) APPLE has
not granted a license to any Third Parties that
permits use of such features in a Mobile
Communications Device with the Android Mobile
OS without additional payment required for the use
of such visual appearance or with additional
payment if HTC agrees to such additional payment
in order to take advantage of the exclusion from
Cloning set forth in this Section 2(b) of this Exhibit
A.
The Cloned Feature in the HTC Android Mobile
Communications Device must have been created by
HTC and not result from (i) any features or design
elements provided to HTC as part of the Android
Mobile OS or other third party component or
software (unless specifically selected, customized or
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modified by, or specifically at the requirement of or
exclusively for, HTC to result in the Cloned
Feature), (ii) requirements specified for the use of
the Android Mobile OS or associate services or
APIs by Google Inc., or any of its affiliates, or the
Open Handset Alliance or any successor to any of
the foregoing, (iii) requirements specified by a
Carrier (in its role as such), (iv) requirements of
Wireless Standards or other standards, where
APPLE is a member and participates and has not
withdrawn and objected to the specification, or any
legal or regulatory requirements, (v) any features or
design elements included in any HTC Android
Mobile Communication Devices or Android Mobile
OS that have been released prior to the Effective
Date, (vi) any features or design elements included
in any HTC Android Mobile Communication
Devices for which APPLE does not provide an
Initial Notice challenging the Cloned Feature within
the time specified in Section 12.3(a) or, if APPLE
has provided such Initial Notice, have nonetheless
not been found to be Cloned Features pursuant to
Section 12.3, and (vii) any features or design
elements substantially the same or minor variants of
those under (v) or (vi) above which are included in
any
subsequent
HTC
Android
Mobile
Communication Device.
There is an alternative appearance to the Distinctive
Apple User Experience reasonably available to
HTC for the HTC Android Mobile Communication
Device that implements and realizes the functional,
cost, and performance advantages of the features(s)
covered by the Covered Patent that would not be
considered Cloned Features (such as the examples
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above regarding “slide to unlock”).33
3. Comparison between the Apple/Microsoft and Apple/HTC
Settlement Agreements
As a brief examination of the licenses presented above easily
illustrates, Apple has become more exacting in the language that it
uses to attempt to thwart the cloning of its products. Both
agreements, however, largely attempt to force competitors to avoid
producing any product that implements features, interfaces,
designs, or appearances that may be considered to be identical or
substantially similar to those of a product that Apple produces, be
it hardware or software. In both cases, the failure to do so results in
the product being labeled a “clone” and thereby is not subject to
the patent license, resulting in potential patent infringement.
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF MISUSE34
Before inquiring as to whether the anti-cloning provisions
contained in the previously discussed settlement agreements
constitute misuse, it is worth examining the foundational aspects of
the misuse doctrine. Examining misuse establishes the bases upon
which the misuse doctrine arose and gives a sense of where bright
lines have been drawn in the past.
The doctrine of intellectual property misuse applied to patent
and copyright law reaches back to just after the turn of the 20th
century, appearing in a patent context within the Supreme Court’s
Motion Picture Patents case.35 The doctrine of misuse evolved and
extended into copyright law as early as 1948 in M. Whitmark &

33

Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
The general survey presented is adopted in part from HERBERT
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d
ed. 2011). For a more in-depth primer on the subject, interested readers are
encouraged to examine Hovenkamp’s excellent analysis.
35
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
34
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Sons v. Jensen.36 Since these extensions, the doctrine has evolved
independently within the respective legal regimes into the present
day, resulting in a mix of similar restraints in some respects but
divergent rules in others. Most notably, while the doctrine of
copyright misuse rests on inherent principles of copyright law,
patent misuse appears to rest primarily on a foundation derived
from principles of antitrust.
A. Patent Misuse Jurisprudence
1. Motion Picture Patents to Mercoid
The first instance of the doctrine of misuse in any intellectual
property context arose in 1917 in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co. where the patentee attempted to enforce a
notice attached to the patentee’s projector that restricted its use to
only films that practiced another of the patentee’s patents.37 The
patentee was found to be unable to leverage “the exclusive right
granted” by the patent on the projector to:
[I]n effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly
by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in
its operation, but which are no part of the patented
invention, or to send its machines forth into the
channels of trade of the country subject to
conditions as to use or royalty to be paid, to be
imposed thereafter at the discretion of such patent
owner.38
Even though the Court’s opinion purported to have found the
doctrine of misuse to be “rooted in patent policy,” the holding
contained an “obvious competitive focus,”39 paying specific
attention to the “extension of the patent monopoly in general and
tying in particular.”40
36

80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
243 U.S. at 502.
38
Id. at 516.
39
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-5.
40
Id.
37
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The patent misuse doctrine gained strength41 through the
Court’s decision in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.42 In
Mercoid, the Court found misuse in Mercoid’s “attempt to control
the market”43 on unpatented combustion switches that were of no
commercial value outside use within Mercoid’s patented domestic
heating system by suing Mid-Continent for contributory
infringement that resulted from Mid-Continent’s manufacture of
combustion switches for use in Mercoid’s system.44
Congress, displeased with the ever-broadening scope of the
misuse doctrine, took action in its general revision of the Patent
Act in 1952, choosing to explicitly curtail the breadth of the
doctrine through restrictions codified in section 271(d) of the
Patent Act.45 This move effectively overruled the rule in Mercoid.
The doctrine of patent misuse retreated in the wake of this reversal,
with the limited expansion that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s
being curtailed by the (then) newly created Federal Circuit.46
Paired with the additional restrictions on misuse placed by
Congress’s revision of the patent statutes by the 1988 Patent
Misuse Reform Act,47 misuse has generally fallen out of favor with
courts and litigants.
2. Modern Misuse: Extension of the Physical or Temporal Scope
of the Patent Grant
The Federal Circuit set forth the modern understanding of
patent misuse in Virginia Panel v. MAC Panel, where it explained
that:
Patent misuse is an affirmative defense to an
41

See Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1942), for examples of
condemnation of tying arrangements and other license restrictions.
42
320 U.S. 661 (1944).
43
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-6.
44
Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 668–69.
45
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010).
46
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-6 to 3-7.
47
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010) (adding
(d)(4)–(5) to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
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accusation of patent infringement, the successful
assertion of which “requires that the alleged
infringer show that the patentee has impermissibly
broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the
patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”48
Thus, this interpretation of patent misuse requires evidence that the
monopoly right granted by the patent has been broadened to
acquire a scope beyond the original grant and that this broadening
has competitive effects. The Virginia Panel court laid out a threetier analysis that embodied this conception of the misuse doctrine:
when faced with a question of whether a misuse defense can
succeed, courts must determine whether the patentee’s conduct
constituted per se misuse; per se legal conduct never categorized as
misuse; or conduct that, depending on its degree of anticompetitive
effect (as analyzed under the Rule of Reason), may be considered
to be misuse.49
In terms of per se misuse, the Federal Circuit noted in Virginia
Panel that some “specific practices [constitute] per se patent
misuse, including so-called tying arrangements in which a patentee
conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee
effectively extends the term of its patent by requiring postexpiration royalties.”50 Some legal theorists believe the per se
categorization of misuse is unlikely to expand beyond these two
categories given recent Federal Circuit decisions that have been
seen as extremely narrowing.51 Indeed, Congress has restrained the
per se category by restricting the doctrine to only consider tying
arrangements to constitute per se misuse where the patentee has

48

Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (quoting Windsurfing Int’l v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
49
Id. at 869 (discussing the per se patent misuse practices, exempted
practices (see, e.g., Mercoid, 320 U.S. 661 (1944)), and conduct that is neither
per se legal nor illegal).
50
Id.
51
Saami Zain, Misuse of Misuse: Princo Corp. v. International Trade
Commission and the Federal Circuit’s Misguided Patent Misuse Jurisprudence,
13 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 95 (Fall 2011).
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market power in the tying market product.52
The second categorization of a patentee’s conduct comprises
conduct that is per se legal and cannot comprise misuse. This
conduct arises from the statutory rights bestowed by the patent
statute. Where the patentee restricts rights that reasonably fall
within the bounds of the original grant, there can never be patent
misuse.53 Examples of conduct that falls within these bounds are:
tying arrangements in which the patentee does not have market
power in the tying product market, enforcing patents against
infringing conduct, and refusing to license (to anyone or someone
in particular).54
The final tier of the Federal Circuit’s misuse test incorporates
antitrust law’s Rule of Reason and was laid out in Virginia Panel:
When a practice alleged to constitute patent misuse
is neither per se patent misuse nor specifically
excluded from a misuse analysis by § 271(d), a
court must determine if that practice is reasonably
within the patent grant, i.e., that it relates to subject
matter within the scope of the patent claims. If so,
the practice does not have the effect of broadening
the scope of the patent claims and thus cannot
constitute patent misuse. If, on the other hand, the
practice has the effect of extending the patentee’s
statutory rights and does so with an anti-competitive
effect, that practice must then be analyzed in
accordance with the ‘rule of reason.’ . . . Under the
rule of reason, the finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into
account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
restraint’s history, nature and effect.55
52

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2010).
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
54
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010).
55
Virginia Panel, 133 F.3d at 869 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Mallinckrodt,
53
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Under the guidance laid out in the Federal Circuit’s three tiers, the
doctrine of patent misuse is correctly classified as being a legal
protection against market distortion that goes beyond the
protection intended by the patent grant itself due to an unlawful
expansion of the grant beyond its intended scope.56
This is not to say that the doctrine of patent misuse is
necessarily coextensive with that of antitrust law or that it is
constrained by antitrust law’s precepts. While it is true that a
finding of misuse often coincides with a finding of antitrust
violations,57 the Supreme Court has been very clear in articulating
its belief that the doctrine of patent misuse arises independently
from patent policy.58 Indeed, patent misuse has been utilized to
reach conduct from which the market or consumers could not
depend on antitrust law to protect them.59 In Mallinckrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc. the Federal Circuit explained:
The concept of patent misuse arose to restrain
practices that did not in themselves violate any law,
but that drew anticompetitive strength from the
patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to
public policy. The policy’s purpose was to prevent a
patentee from using the patent to obtain market
benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory
patent right.60
This explanation provides for the existence of patent misuse where
there is an expansion of the patent grant, even when the expansion
has no anticompetitive effects.
Indeed, while the bifurcation of a trial into infringement and
antitrust prongs (including misuse) in order to hopefully avoid
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.2, at 3-10.
57
See, e.g., In re ISO Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Virginia Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124
F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
58
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (holding that
misuse is based in patent policy and does not require proof of an antitrust
violation).
59
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700.
60
Id.
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unnecessary antitrust litigation depending on the outcome of the
patent portion of the litigation will not render the issue of patent
misuse moot, a trial is generally required regardless of the outcome
of the patent portion of the litigation, further underscoring the
doctrinal separateness between antitrust and misuse.61
Furthermore, as a defense grounded solely in equity, the misuse
inquiry does not carry a constitutional guarantee to a jury trial,
unlike antitrust counterclaims.62
B. Copyright Misuse Jurisprudence
Copyright misuse is regarded as younger than patent misuse,
with most older cases refusing to acknowledge the existence of
copyright misuse63 and only a small number of district court cases
prior to 1990 granting relief based on the misuse defense64
(although two cases in the early 1900s may have indicated some
elements of the judiciary’s willingness to rely on principles of
equity, i.e., “unclean hands,” to prevent abuses of copyright
grants65). In any event, copyright misuse truly blossomed with the
advent of commercial software. This allowed for copyright grants
to potentially have substantial anticompetitive effects on a market
as a whole, a rarity in traditional copyright domains.66
61

HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-79.
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 06-491-MPT, 2009 WL
2252556, at *1 (D. Del. July 28, 2009) (“[T]he right to trial to a jury on a claim
for patent misuse is not automatic.”).
63
See, e.g., Foreign Car Parts v. Auto World, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 977, 979
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (“It is doubtful that an anti-trust violation creates a defense in a
copyright infringement action.”).
64
See M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948);
Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 615–16 (D.R.I.
1976).
65
See Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2d
Cir. 1903); Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir.
1915). Both findings of unclean hands resulted from misrepresentations to the
court or copyright office regarding the copyrighted works.
66
Cf. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1170 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is often more difficult to prove an antitrust violation
when the claim rests on the questionable market power associated with a
copyright . . . .”).
62
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As opposed to its older sibling patent misuse, in which antitrust
concerns dominate almost every inquiry, copyright misuse today is
commonly thought of as being wholly separate from antitrust law.
While early courts considering the defense centered their inquiries
squarely on antitrust principles,67 more modern inquiries have
moved away from a reliance on antitrust principles and have
justified findings of copyright misuse by relying solely on
copyright policy arguments.68
Findings of copyright misuse tend to rely on rationales that are
said to arise from copyright policy. These rationales vary, but they
tend to fall within one of three broad categories identified by
Hovenkamp: abuse of process and extension of right rationales,
competition and licensing rationales, and externality rationales.69
Rationales relying on abuse of process or an extension of the
rights granted by copyright do not require any implication of
antitrust concerns. These rationales rest on principles grounded in
copyright policy. In the case of improperly broadened grants of
copyright, the rationale rests on the principle that misuse can be
found in attempts to expand the copyright grant beyond its
statutory boundaries and courts should not assist in this expansion
by enforcing the expanded grant.70
67

See Bellsouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Information Pub.,
Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no copyright misuse “in the
context before us because there is no antitrust violation”), vacated, 977 F.2d
1435 (1992); Reed–Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir.
1996) (“Misuse of copyright in pursuit of an anticompetitive end may be a
defense to a suit for infringement, along the lines of the patent-misuse doctrine
in antitrust.” The court then argued that less market power is present in
copyright than in patent, appearing to weaken the doctrine.).
68
See Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d
516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (1998) (“[A] defendant in a
copyright infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a
copyright misuse defense.”); Lasercomb American, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d
970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The question is not whether the copyright is being
used in a manner violative of antitrust law . . . but whether the copyright is being
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright.”).
69
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.4, 3-58.
70
Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, 350 F.3d 640, 647
(7th Cir. 2003) (“The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the

178 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:3

In perhaps the seminal copyright misuse case, Lasercomb
America v. Reynolds, the Fourth Circuit relied on this rationale
exclusive of any antitrust concerns.71 Even though the contract
clauses at issue in Lasercomb may have had anticompetitive
effects, the court did not inquire into the effect the clauses may
have actually had on competition.72 In Lasercomb the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant’s use of unauthorized copies of the
plaintiff’s die-making software.73 Lasercomb’s licensing
agreement contained clauses that prohibited licensees or their
employees from “directly or indirectly, writ[ing], develop[ing],
produc[ing] or sell[ing] computer assisted die making software”
during the term of the license, which was ninety-nine years,
potentially far in excess of the term of the copyright grant itself.74
While the court noted that “[t]here is no question that defendants
engaged in unauthorized copying, and the purposefulness of their
unlawful action is manifest from their deceptive practices,”75 the
court affirmed the existence of the misuse of copyright as a valid
defense (analogizing its existence from patent misuse as a sister
intellectual property regime) and found that the “misuse arises
from Lasercomb’s attempt to use its copyright in a particular
expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an area
outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die
manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an
antitrust violation.”76 In this way, the court specifically distanced
the copyright misuse doctrine from necessarily relying on any
antitrust principles, a stark difference from patent misuse, as
previously discussed (see supra Part II.A.2.).
bounds of antitrust, besides the fact that confined to antitrust the doctrine would
be redundant, is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain
property protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer,
hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist
effectively, is an abuse of process.”).
71
911 F.2d 970 (1990).
72
Id. at 979.
73
Id. at 972.
74
Id. at 973.
75
Id. at 971.
76
Id. at 979.
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Comparing the expansion of the copyright grant to the abuse of
process, findings of misuse based on deception before the courts or
the copyright office are also clearly reliant on principles of
copyright policy as opposed to competition concerns. In a sense,
abuses of process are a type of extension of the copyright grant in
that the copyright is improvidently granted to improperly cover
subject matter that should remain free of the copyright monopoly.77
Rationales relying on competition and licensing concerns most
closely mirror the majority of asserted bases of patent misuse.
Cases relying on these rationales commonly involve collusions to
fix prices, tying arrangements, noncompetition provisions, or
exclusive dealing provisions, among other traditionally
anticompetitive behaviors. Similar to the antitrust foundation of
patent misuse, copyright misuse defenses in these cases do not
“claim . . . that the copyright owner has transgressed copyright
policy by seeking to expand the scope or duration of the right, but
that she has acted anticompetitively in the licensing of that right.”78
This rationale, while seemingly strong due to its parallel with
patent misuse, actually proves to be rather disfavored within the
doctrine of copyright misuse. It appears, at least on the surface, to
be one of the weaker rationales for finding the presence of misuse.
For example, Lasercomb could easily have rested on (or at least
gestured at) the anticompetitive effects that limiting licensees from
developing competing software would have had in the market.
Plainly, allowing a dominant player to prohibit any interested party
(its licensees) from even dabbling in independent creation of a
competing product restricts competition in a manner that the
Department of Justice’s 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property would consider worth analyzing
77

qad. inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266–67 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (“When a copyright holder attempts to use legal proceedings to protect an
improper extension of a copyright, the court may refuse to enforce the copyright.
. . . [qad’s] misuse of both the judicial process and the copyright laws . . .
severely restrained ALN . . . [and] impos[ed] an unwarranted harm on ALN . . . .
That copyright misuse extended qad’s copyright privilege beyond the scope of
the grant and violated the very purpose of a copyright. . . . This Court should not
and will not offer its aid to a copyright holder whose actions run contrary to the
purpose of the copyright itself.”).
78
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.4, at 3-61 to -62.
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for competitive effect.79 The Lasercomb court, however, chose not
to inquire about the anticompetitive effects, relying entirely on
copyright policy, as discussed previously, to hold that copyright
misuse had occurred.
Similarly, the final set of rationales concerning the potential or
known existence of troubling externalities have been applied to
licensing policies that do not necessarily implicate antitrust issues.
Where licenses contain contractual terms that impose burdens on
third parties or the public without compensation, courts should
consider whether the imposition constitutes a departure from the
limits on copyright grants as dictated by copyright policy. Robert
Merges considers every holding of misuse (including patent
misuse) to be grounded in this rationale (in the abstract) in some
respect, claiming that “[u]nder [misuse] doctrines, courts refuse to
enforce voluntary, bilateral contracts that presumably benefit both
parties . . . . The only workable rationale for such a prohibition
must be that the contracts, though mutually beneficial to the
contracting parties, harm third parties.”80
Although this rationale seems to be broader in its applicability
79

The U.S. Department of Justice’s guidelines for analyzing antitrust
concerns in innovation markets:
3.2.3 Research and development: innovation markets
If a licensing arrangement may adversely affect competition to
develop new or improved goods or processes, the Agencies
will analyze such an impact either as a separate competitive
effect in relevant goods or technology markets, or as a
competitive effect in a separate innovation market. A licensing
arrangement may have competitive effects on innovation that
cannot be adequately addressed through the analysis of goods
or technology markets. For example, the arrangement may
affect the development of goods that do not yet exist.
Alternatively, the arrangement may affect the development of
new or improved goods or processes in geographic markets
where there is no actual or likely potential competition in the
relevant goods.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 1995),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t323.
80
See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1606 n.96 (1995).
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due to its foothold in contract law, it is no less limited than the two
prior rationales due to the limitations of the defense of copyright
misuse. If no copyright claim is brought before the court and the
plaintiff chooses to rely solely on state law rights under contract
law, then misuse, even if present, may not be considered, even
under this rationale. Where both a contract and copyright claim are
brought, misuse, if found, may only bar the copyright claim,
leaving the defendant to still face the untouched contract claim.81
C. Contrasting Approaches and Restraints Within Misuse
To this point, the application of the misuse doctrine has been
discussed in both patent and copyright contexts. While the doctrine
is very similar in many respects in its basis and grounding in both
contexts, some differences exist between the two. Namely, while
copyright misuse firmly declaims any suspicion of being grounded
in antitrust law and relies almost entirely on arguments based in
copyright policy in finding misuse, patent misuse, which ostensibly
grounds itself in patent policy, is much more concerned with
antitrust analysis in its inquiries. Beyond this primary difference,
various restraints on the doctrine of misuse also differ between the
two disciplines.
1. Statutory Restraints on Patent Misuse
The doctrine of misuse is only an affirmative defense. This
structural restraint on the remedies a claim of misuse can provide
is actually one of the primary factors in the Federal Circuit’s
insistence that misuse exists separate from antitrust law, its logic
being that misuse should require a lesser burden of proof because
the remedies it can provide are more limited in nature.82 However,
81

Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000)
(“[T]he court need not decide whether there was copyright misuse because
Plaintiff does not allege copyright infringement [only common law misappropriation, unfair competition, and breach of contract of the license agreement].”).
82
Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“When a party seeks to collect monetary damages from a patentee
because of alleged violations of the antitrust law, it is appropriate to require a
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although courts and commentators have analogized the doctrine of
misuse to the equitable defense of unclean hands, the doctrine of
misuse is far broader, barring both equitable and legal remedies.83
Interestingly, misuse is not always available as an affirmative
action for declaratory judgment.84 This restraint is not exceedingly
common, however, and most courts have allowed such motions to
proceed.85
Additionally, unlike antitrust concerns or unclean hands,
misuse can be cured, restoring the enforceability of the intellectual
property right.86 This cure, however, is not easily achieved and
only occurs once an offending rightsholder ceases the conduct
considered to be misuse and the effects of the offending conduct
have been “purged” or have “fully dissipated.”87
Findings of misuse generally cannot prevent the collection of
damages for conduct that occurred before the misuse began.88
higher degree of misconduct for that damage award than when a party asserts
only a defense against an infringement claim.”).
83
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-71.
84
Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1199
(C.D. Cal. 2008); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411,
428 (D.N.J. 2005); Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269
F. Supp. 2d 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
85
Midwest Tape, LL v. Recorded Books, LLC, No. 3:09 CV 2176, 2010
WL 1258101, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2010) (“[B]ecause the Complaint seeks
declaratory judgment, the plaintiff may assert copyright misuse as an affirmative
claim.”); Linzer Prods. Corp. v. Sekar, 499 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1079–81 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 756558,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
86
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-72.
87
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04; United States Gypsum
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457 (1957), reh’g denied, 353 U.S. 932
(1957) (“[T]he courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to
recover any of their emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or
thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or ‘purged’ as
the conventional saying goes.”).
88
Carotek, Inc. v. Kobayashi Ventures, LLC, No. 07 CIV. 11163 (NRB),
2010 WL 1640190, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (“Carotek has not pointed us
to a single decision holding that a patent misuse defense should bar a claim for
unpaid royalties that accrued prior to the period of alleged misuse, and we can
discern no persuasive reason for reaching such a conclusion.”).
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However, whether or not retroactive damages for infringing
conduct that occurred during the period of misuse are allowed
depends on the discipline, with patent law being unlikely to allow
such damages to accrue89 but copyright appearing to allow them.90
As noted before, findings of misuse, while prohibiting the
enforcement of intellectual property rights against infringers, do
not obviate contractual responsibilities and will be of limited use in
defending against state law contract claims.91 However, contract
law claims may turn out to be obviated by misuse should they
accompany infringement actions, as a successful misuse defense
may remove from the table any potential damages due to
infringement. Additionally, the unenforceability of an intellectual
property grant may render a license unconscionable (and thus
unenforceable) since the license would (potentially) lack
consideration on the rightsholder’s side.92
Finally, while a finding of misuse will render the intellectual
property grant unenforceable, where the offending conduct must
lie in order to render a grant unenforceable has shifted over time.
Traditionally, allegations of misuse of any one patent or a pattern
of misuse in several patents unconnected with litigation was
sufficient to prohibit enforcement of any patents held by a party.93
This has apparently been constrained by the Federal Circuit in
Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, requiring either
the use of the patent or a connection between the offending
conduct and the patent right.94 Similar restraints exist within
copyright law, with most courts requiring some nexus or
89

HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6, at 3-74.
Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (“[T]he doctrine does not prevent
plaintiff from ultimately recovering for acts of infringement that occur during
the period of misuse.”).
91
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
92
The use of a license agreement that grants rights beyond a bare patent or
copyright license, such as providing know-how, consulting, or other similar
consideration, will likely allow any breach of contract claims to stand, although
perhaps being reduced in potential damages.
93
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 3.6c, at 3-80 (“[A] pattern of misuse might
bar the enforcement of any patents by the misuser.”).
94
Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
90
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connection between the conduct, although at least one court found
misuse in the absence of such a connection.95
D. The Intersection of Misuse and Antitrust
Throughout this discussion of the doctrine of misuse, the
competitive effects of the doctrine have not been far removed from
the picture, even where, as in copyright, the doctrine explicitly
disclaims a reliance on antitrust principles.96 A primary reason for
this is the very nature of the nation’s intellectual property regime.
In creating the legal fiction of “intellectual property,” the
government and legal system have necessarily prevented the
market from truly efficient conduct, since intellectual property
never faces scarcity in that it is a non-rivalrous good.97 Truly
efficient and competitive market behavior would be characterized
by the quick dissemination and widespread adoption of every
advancement in technology not held as a trade secret as well as the
continual publication and republication of literary and artistic
works as the market demanded. Of course, the Founders, in their
wisdom, devised the framework for incentivized disclosure around
which intellectual property regimes center today. The public good
served by the advancement of the “useful arts and sciences”98 was
the only reason they consented to the “embarrassment of an
95

See Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1080–81; see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 345–46 (D.N.J. 2002)
(requiring proof of a “nexus between . . . alleged anti-competitive actions and
[BVHE’s] power over copyrighted material” (quoting Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v.
Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y.1979))).
96
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); see also
Assessment Technologies v. WIREdata, 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003)
(emphasizing the copyright policy basis of modern misuse doctrine and noting
that “[c]ases such as Lasercomb, however, cut misuse free from antitrust”); In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(describing antitrust and public policy rationales for misuse as two different
approaches favored by different circuits).
97
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 1.1, at 1-1.
98
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).

2015]

THE ANTI-CLONE WARS:
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS

185

exclusive patent.”99 As such, the very nature of the intellectual
property regime has anticompetitive effects that the courts must
always keep in mind.
1. Anticompetitive Effects
Leaving aside any analysis or critique of the intellectual
property system as a whole that may have been implied above,
specific attention must be paid to the perniciousness of intellectual
property misuse on the market. Congress possesses the ability to
simultaneously (1) recognize and structure intellectual property
regimes to appropriately balance and account for competing
interests when incentivizing the advancement of the useful arts and
sciences; (2) ensure the efficient functioning of markets; and (3)
protect the public’s interests and welfare. The misuse of granted
intellectual property rights violently disrupts this careful balance
by taking this ability for granted. Acts of misuse include extending
the grant beyond the explicitly restricted framework, leveraging
the grant to inflict harm on the markets beyond that contemplated
by the legislature, or hiding unlawful anticompetitive conduct
behind a veneer of legality granted by the conferred right. In this
way misuse betrays the public’s trust and harms the very
framework on which the alleged misuser relies for enforcement.
Most anticompetitive conduct involving intellectual property is
immortalized in licensing agreements. In looking at the
anticompetitive effect a licensing agreement may exhibit, the
central question is “whether it harms competition among entities
that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in the
absence of the arrangement.”100 This inquiry should examine
various factors, such as whether the license agreements
“anticompetitively foreclose access to competing technologies,
prevent licensees from developing their own competing
technologies, or facilitate market allocation or price-fixing for any
99

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
100
U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, supra note 79,
at Example 1: Discussion.
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product or service supplied by the licensees.”101 The inclusion of
such terms should immediately signal to the reviewer that
anticompetitive behavior may be afoot and that closer scrutiny of
the effects of the license is required.
Some of the primary anticompetitive conduct that courts (and
agencies) are concerned with when dealing with intellectual
property agreements include monopolization (anticompetitive
conduct designed either to acquire or to maintain monopoly power
by means other than normal competition), horizontal market
division (anticompetitive conduct intended to limit competition by
restricting competition between otherwise antagonistic competitors
to prescribed markets), or other non-price restrictions (typically
anticompetitive conduct tending to inhibit the development of
future competition).102
For example, a licensor prohibition on using a competitor’s
products is clearly misuse.103 A prohibition on the development of
competing products, which effectively denies or impedes the
entrance of a potential competitor into the market, is analogously
misuse.104
Of particular interest to the discussion of anti-cloning
provisions is the Seventh Circuit decision in Bela Seating Co. v.
Poloron Prod.105 There, a non-price restriction prohibiting the
manufacture of chairs other than the licensed design that were of a
“substantially identical design” was found to be perfectly
acceptable and not considered to be misuse. Central to this holding,
101

Id.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 10.3.
103
Krampe v. Ideal Indus., 347 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(“Plaintiff’s use of the rights which he possessed in his invention to secure an
additional right to which he was not entitled [prohibiting the licensee from
selling competing products], combined with his maintaining the objectionable
terms of the contract after these rights had ripened into a patent monopoly,
constitutes misuse of his patent . . . .”).
104
Compton v. Metal Prods., 453 F.2d 38, 45 (4th Cir. 1971) (“The public,
in a system of free competition, is entitled to have the competition of other
devices with a patented device and here it is against that public’s interest to use
the patent to suppress such competition.” (quoting McCullough v. Kammerer
Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1948)).).
105
438 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1971).
102

2015]

THE ANTI-CLONE WARS:
THE PER SE ILLEGALITY OF ANTI-CLONING PROVISIONS

187

however, was the court’s interpretation of the license as “an
agreement that the licensee would not make other chairs that would
infringe on the patent in question.”106 Thus, the prohibition falls
squarely within the scope of the granted patent right because the
patentee is entitled to exclude all others from infringing his or her
patent as a matter of right.107
This holding leads to a very interesting counterpoint. If the
restriction is legal because it remained within the bounds of the
granted right, prohibitions on non-infringing activity, which would
be beyond the scope of the granted right, are likely to be found to
be unenforceable and should constitute a potential misuse of the
grant. Indeed, were there a way to clone the chair without
infringing the patent grant, the prohibition would be outside of the
scope of the grant and presumptively, under this reasoning, illegal.
2. Anticompetitive Settlement of IP Disputes
This is not to say that every restriction attached to an
intellectual property license is likely to constitute misuse,
especially where the license arises within a settlement agreement.
This is because a settlement agreement that “would otherwise
produce an antitrust violation might be no more anticompetitive
than the outcome of the underlying IP litigation.”108 For example, a
suit that concludes with a finding of validity and infringement for a
patentee may completely exclude a competitor from the market.109
Thus, there is no decrease in competition where a settlement
between the parties produced an identical result. However, just
because there may be no reduction in competition does not excuse
courts from ensuring that the settlement does not in fact violate
antitrust principles. Given the frequent uncertainty surrounding the
scope and validity of intellectual property rights, it is often in the

106

HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 33.6 (referencing id. at 739 (“[T]he
restriction in the Bela agreements are limited to the manufacture of chairs
covered by the claims of the patent in suit.”)).
107
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2010).
108
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 7.1b.
109
Id.
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interest of the opposing parties to “share monopoly profits”110
rather than pay for a roll of the die in litigation.
Courts also favor settlement agreements because they save
time, money, and ever-scarce judicial resources while avoiding the
strict “dichotomy between winners and losers created by
adjudication.”111 Legal and economic scholars largely concur with
this opinion,112 although there has been both vigorous dissent113
and measured criticism on this point.114 The increasing caseload of
the federal judiciary due to the rise in federal litigation has caused
federal judges to evolve from insulated arbiters into involved
parties that are potentially as eager to see the case resolved as one
or both of the other parties.115 Indeed, “[w]hile few judges wish to
force unwilling parties to settle, many judges believe that the
promotion of informed and fair settlements is one of the most
important aims of pretrial management.”116 As such, when tried
cases are the exception to the rule,117 particular attention should be
paid to the result of settlement negotiations and the growing and
persistent potential for settlement agreements to wreak
anticompetitive havoc on the market.
a. Hovenkamp’s framework for the analysis of settlements
Given these competing interests, Hovenkamp has set out a
110

Id. at § 7.1.
Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67
VAND. L. REV. 375, 383 (2014).
112
Id. at 385.
113
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984)
(arguing settlement brings about peace but not necessarily justice).
114
See, for example, Laurie Kratky Dore, Public Courts Versus Private
Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 463 (2006) (“Since the early to mid-1990s, the issue
of secrecy in litigation has attracted nationwide attention and has generated a
literal mountain of commentary.”) for an example of commentary directed at a
specific aspect of settlement agreements.
115
La Belle, supra note 111, at 411.
116
Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 773
(1981).
117
La Belle, supra note 111, at 391.
111
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framework for analyzing intellectual property settlement
agreements.118 This framework is mentioned here to anticipate any
rejoinder to the analysis of the anti-cloning provisions in Part III as
not taking into account the provisions’ status as part of a settlement
agreement, should they have possible pro-competitive effects.
Under the framework, there are three types of settlements:
settlements that raise no antitrust concerns even in the absence of
an IP dispute, settlements that raise antitrust concerns even in the
absence of an IP dispute, and settlements that may raise antitrust
concerns depending on the merits of the IP dispute.119
Generally speaking, cases that fall within the first category
include agreements that encourage competition (i.e., reciprocal
non-exclusive licenses). Typically, cases that fall within the second
category include those that do not rely on determinations of patent
or copyright policy to find injurious conduct present (i.e.,
geographical market divisions extending to products beyond the
scope of a patent).120 The final category necessitates an
examination of the merits of the intellectual property dispute. An
example of this would be a case of blocking patents—a finding of
validity for both patents results in neither party being able to
practice the invention without a license, so any license will
increase competition. A finding of invalidity for one or both of the
patents, however, would render anticompetitive any license that
restricts a party from competition.121
While the third prong’s framework is novel and certainly worth
the reader’s attention, its consideration must be left for later
examination; presentation of this framework is not with the
intention to examine whether anti-cloning provisions constitute
antitrust violations (although this subject is certainly worth further
inquiry), but rather to point out that even where settlement may
have competition-enhancing aspects, anticompetitive behaviors in
settlements may still be sufficient to call the agreement into
question, even in a situation where limited monopolies have been
given legal force by intellectual property grants.
118
119
120
121

HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL
Below are presented arguments in favor of considering anticloning provisions per se misuse of copyrights and patents, or in
the alternative, at least subject to the examination of potential
anticompetitive results. For the purposes of this argument, only the
anti-cloning provisions within patent cross-licensing agreements
will be considered (since those are the most common), although
the argument extends to copyright misuse for reasons previously
discussed (e.g., the misuse of copyrights is subject to fewer
statutory limitations, less reliance on antitrust principles, and has a
harsher view of the expansion of the copyright grant).
A. Anti-Cloning Provisions Unlawfully Extend the Patent Grant
As defined by the patent statute, a utility patent is granted to
those who invent or discover “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof,”122 and a design patent is granted to
those who invent “any new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture.”123 A granted patent entitles the inventor to
the right to exclude others from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to
sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United States or
import[ing] into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent.”124 The scope of the patent grant, then,
necessarily resides within these statutorily prescribed boundaries to
include only the defined elements of patentable subject matter and
the right to exclude others from conduct.
As seen in the anti-cloning provisions set forth in Part I,
licensors have attempted to grant patent rights to licensees while
restricting the practice of these licensed patents to include elements
or conduct not specifically included within the statutory grant. As
an example, the Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision attempts to
prohibit HTC from developing or producing a product that is
122
123
124

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
Id. § 171.
Id. § 271.
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substantially similar to one produced by Apple that practices any
licensed patent in any respect.
Specifically, Apple has attempted to prohibit HTC from
developing products where a “non-functional distinctive visual
appearance of [a] feature in the HTC Mobile Communications
Device is substantially similar to that in the APPLE Mobile
Communications Device, it being understood however that such
features will also include functional aspects (collective,
‘Distinctive Apple User Experience’).”125 To do so necessarily
implicates prohibiting HTC from utilizing otherwise unprotected
(and perhaps unprotectable) elements in its development and
production cycle if HTC desires to use any of the licensed patents
within its products. This prohibition expands the scope of the
patent grant to wildly inappropriate lengths.
For example, consider the “slide to unlock” bar at the bottom
of the screen as a feature that could be considered to be a part of
the Distinctive Apple User Experience. The patent claiming the
“slide to unlock” bar only claims “displaying an unlock image at a
first predefined location on the touch-sensitive display while the
device is in a user-interface lock state.”126 The patent’s figure 4A
actually places the bar in the middle of the screen, with figure 7A
placing it at the bottom of the screen.127 In licensing the patent,
given that Apple has already developed and deployed a “slide to
unlock” feature with the bar at the bottom of the screen, should
HTC practice the patent in a feature that looks similar to Apple’s
and is placed in a similar location (indeed in a location disclosed
by the very patent itself), Apple could accuse HTC of cloning the
feature and revoke the license to practice the patent in that instance
under the terms of the HTC/Apple anti-cloning provision.128
Some may argue that anti-cloning provisions are merely fieldof-use limitations and thus subject to, if anything, rule of reason
analysis under antitrust laws.129 This argument is misguided.
125

Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8.
U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 col. 20 l. 19–21 (filed Jun. 2, 2009).
127
Id.
128
Apple/HTC anti-cloning provision, supra note 8.
129
B. Braun Med., Inc. v Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“[F]ield of use restrictions . . . are generally upheld, see General Talking
126
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Supposing the provision is a field of use limitation, the provision
allows the licensee to practice the licensed patent(s) in any manner
except in conjunction with certain non-patentable subject matter.
This phrasing exposes the limitation for what it is: leveraging a
patent grant to “restrain competition in an unpatented product”130
(here, the appearance and functional aspects of the Apple
products).
Apple, in possession of patents that enjoy market power due to
consumer preferences, refuses to license these patents without
ensuring contractual protection of intellectual property that
ostensibly falls outside of the current regime. In doing so, the
settlement agreement attempts to extend the patent grant to cover
this intellectual property. This occurs due to how the license is set
up. Should HTC produce a product that practices one of Apple’s
licensed patents without “infringing” on the Distinctive Apple User
Experience, the product is licensed and HTC does not infringe on
Apple’s patents. Should HTC produce a product that practices one
of Apple’s licensed patents while “infringing” on the Distinctive
Apple User Experience, the product is not licensed and HTC does
infringe on Apple’s patents. As such, but for the infringement of
the Distinctive Apple User Experience, HTC would not incur
liability for patent infringement, extending the scope of the patent
grant to cover the unpatentable subject matter.
Some may question whether forbidding licenses that prohibit
the wholesale cloning of features in competing product lines is a
positive endeavor. Is it not good for innovation to allow parties to
settle a case in a manner in which the patent infringer obtains a
license to use the patent in some fields of use but not others? Why
should a patent holder have to license patents for use in directly
competitive products when the infringer can use the patent in other
products?
Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127 . . . , and any anticompetitive effects they may cause
are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d
at 708, 24 USPQ2d at 1179–80.”).
130
Id. (“Two common examples of such impermissible broadening are
using a patent which enjoys market power in the relevant market . . . to restrain
competition in an unpatented product or employing the patent beyond its 17year term.”).
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First, as discussed previously, the anti-cloning provisions are
not mere field of use restrictions. If Apple wanted to restrict HTC
or Microsoft from deploying “slide to unlock” in mobile devices,
Apple is certainly free to attempt to license the “slide to unlock”
patent with that restriction in place. Apple is not likely to get much
interest in that license, however, because the patent’s true value
rests in the ease with which it integrates user actions with
unlocking mobile devices, be they phones or tablets. Anti-cloning
provisions, as opposed to the exemplar field of use restrictions
above, restrict the practice of the patents not in certain fields but
rather in combination with other non-patentable subject matter. It
is this defining characteristic that removes the anti-cloning
provisions from being simple field-of-use restrictions and places
them squarely within the domain of patent misuse.
Second, Apple is under no obligation to license its patents to
anyone.131 Apple is also under no obligation to license its patents
to competitors without limiting the license to exclude the fields of
competition (such as the example in the previous paragraph).
However, should Apple choose to license its patents to competitors
without such a field limitation, Apple may not restrict the usage of
the licensed patents within that field to hinder competition by
requiring that the patents not be practiced in conjunction with nonpatentable subject matter, as it does with anti-cloning provisions.
The possible procompetitive benefits that may be alleged are
inconsequential. In both instances, the anti-cloning provisions
serve to impermissibly restrict competition by improperly
expanding the patent grant via licensure to capture unpatentable
subject matter that rests squarely outside of the exclusive rights
provided by the patent grant. Ignoring this fact in favor of any
potential procompetitive argument only serves to undermine the
patent system as a whole and intellectual property as a general
concept.
131

Cygnus Therapeutic Systems v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (“[The patentee] was under no obligation to license [its patented
product]. The patent statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a)
(1994). Indeed, a patentee may, if it wishes, do nothing with the subject matter
of the patent. See King Instrument Corp. v. Perego . . . .”).
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1. This Extension is Broader and More Flagrant than Term
Expansions
While anti-cloning provisions should be considered to
constitute misuse simply due to the extension of the patent grant to
cover unpatentable subject matter, this extension of the patent
grant is actually broader and more flagrant than other term
expansions in that it entirely removes unpatentable innovation
from being brought to the market by others. This is especially true
if we accept Apple’s allegations that its success in the market is
due, in large part, to its user experience.132 In granting patents, the
market is always deprived of some elements of an innovation for a
period of time. An extension of this deprivation (i.e., patent term
extension), while harmful, has a limited effect because the vacuum
was created in order to incentivize the innovation in the first place.
Expansions of the scope or coverage of the patent grant have much
more pernicious effects on the marketplace. Through these
provisions, Apple can potentially exclude all licensees from
utilizing non-patentable subject matter in their products or
innovations as long as Apple is able to continue to secure patents
with its market power that are sufficient to leverage acquiescence
to its anti-cloning provisions. Consumers are denied fair
competition regarding this subject matter so long as Apple’s
competitors must agree to not engage in competition. This vacuum
was not created in order to incentivize innovation. Rather, the
vacuum is forcibly imposed on the market by an actor that
possesses market power.

132

Complaint at 1, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al, 5:12cv-00630 (N.D. Cal. Feb 08, 2012) (“Apple’s iconic mobile devices . . . are now
among the most distinctive and successful products in the world. The
revolutionary patented design and user experience of these products are the
result of Apple’s massive investment in innovation and have contributed to the
extraordinary acclaim and success of Apple’s products.”).
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B. Anti-Cloning Provisions are Anticompetitive
By prohibiting Apple’s competitors from utilizing elements
and subject matter that would otherwise be available to them (due
to being unprotected by the patent grant), the anti-cloning
provisions restrain effective competition on the merits. This
necessarily reduces competition in that it prevents the use of any of
the licensed patents in a context that the market has approved of
and adapted to by any competitors. For example, the Apple/HTC
licensing agreement specifically identifies the “slide to unlock” bar
at the bottom of the screen as a feature that could be considered to
be a part of the Distinctive Apple User Experience.133 Assuming
for the moment that there are other ways that the “slide to unlock”
feature could be implemented, such as along the side of the phone,
the inertial position of the market impacts the demand. Apple, as a
prime mover in the smartphone market, is in a position to guide
user preferences by simply implementing features and making the
market accustomed to certain aspects of those features. If effective
competition requires a user experience or appearance that is similar
to products on the market or an experience or appearance that
possesses a similar veneer of non-patentable subject matter, any
restraint on using the non-patentable subject matter clearly hinders
that competition.
While the America Invents Act removes the best mode defense
from alleged infringers’ available defenses, the requirement that
the best mode be included within the specification of an
application remains.134 The patent is granted to the patentee in
exchange for disclosing the patentee’s invention to the public. This
disclosure is intended to enable the public to practice the invention
once the patent has expired and to release the invention into the
public domain. Should a licensor require that the best mode of an
invention (or perhaps the only mode of an invention) not be
practiced by the licensee, the licensee’s ability to provide robust
133

Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7.
Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2013)
(“[A]ny requirement of section 112, except that the failure to disclose the best
mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.”).
134
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competition is effectively gutted. Here, through anti-cloning
provisions, Apple potentially licenses its patents on the condition
that the best mode (as embodied within the Distinctive Apple User
Experience) of the disclosed invention not be practiced or else the
resulting product be considered to be unlicensed and infringing. As
such, the anti-cloning restrictions should always be considered to
be anticompetitive.
C. Anti-Cloning Provisions are More Pernicious than Reverse
Engineering Clauses
It may be argued at this point that these anti-cloning provisions
are akin to restrictions on reverse engineering and that there are
facial similarities between them; thus, since restrictions on reverse
engineering are permitted, so too should anti-cloning provisions be
allowed. A brief introduction to reverse engineering prohibitions
followed by an analysis of the key differences between reverse
engineering prohibitions and anti-cloning provisions will address
this argument.
1. Reverse Engineering is a Matter of Copyright Law that May Be
Restrained by Contract
In Bowers v. Baystate,135 the Federal Circuit held that parties
are free to enter into agreements that enforce stricter requirements
than copyright law protections allow and that such agreements are
not preempted by copyright law. This notion relies heavily on
ProCD v. Zeidenberg,136 where the court determined that
uncopyrightable materials could be protected by shrinkwrap
licenses because no new exclusive rights were created for the
copyright holder. Furthermore, the court in Bowers noted that Data
General v. Grumman137 demonstrated that state laws dealing with
similar subject matter as federal copyright laws (the unlawful
copying of trade secret materials and unlawful copying,
135
136
137

1994).

320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir.
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respectively) are not necessarily preempted so long as the state law
is not wholly encompassed by copyright law.138
Judge Dyk’s vigorous dissent in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc.139 and the extensive commentary against the
majority’s holding140 center around the harm to necessary
limitations on the copyright grant, such as fair use reverse
engineering, that is done by allowing shrinkwrapped contracts,
which are commonly compared to contracts of adhesion, to
effectuate the removal of such limitations. While Judge Dyk freely
admits that the contracting away of a fair use defense or
agreements to not engage in all permissible uses of copyrightable
material that an unconstrained licensor may be entitled to is both
possible and legal, he requires that the agreement be “freely
negotiated” and thus add an “extra element” to the contract law
claim that allows it to avoid preemption under Data General.141
While convincing to many academics and commentators, the
dissent has not been adopted and the majority opinion has been
consistently followed.142 However, the perniciousness of
restrictions on reverse engineering, even where the restrictions are
unbargained for, is limited solely to the expression of the
underlying structure of a program and does not prohibit the
development of apparent behaviors that require no decompilation
to discover. In that sense, a restriction on reverse engineering,
while potentially harmful to copyright policy (especially with
138

Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324.
Id. at 1335 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
140
See, e.g., David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After
Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 644 (2004);
Christopher M. Kaiser, Comment, Take it or Leave it: Monsanto v. McFarling,
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, and the Federal Circuit’s Formalistic
Approach to Contracts of Adhesion, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 487 (2005); Jonathan
Wilson, Case Note, Can a Copyright Holder Prevent Reverse Engineering? The
Federal Circuit Court Holds that the Federal Copyright Act Does Not Preempt
“No Reverse Engineering” Clauses, 8 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 467
(2004).
141
Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1336–37.
142
See, e.g., Neon Enter. Software, LLC v. IBM Corp., No. A-09-CA-896
AWA, 2011 WL 2036674 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (dealing with “reverse assembly”);
cf. Hotsamba, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4882, Copy. L.
Rep. (CCH) P28, 788 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2004).
139
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regard to interoperability), does not encompass the whole of the
uncopyrightable elements of a work. Indeed, copyright law
explicitly does not cover the behavioral aspects of software;
therefore, if a developer is able to determine the underlying
workings of a particular piece of software from a facial
examination or is able to reproduce the behaviors in a different
manner, the rightsholder has no recourse, as the substantially
similar end product (behavior) is not the object of protection.
2. Differentiation between Anti-Reverse Engineering and AntiCloning Restrictions
Contractual restrictions on reverse engineering and contractual
restrictions on cloning activities are fundamentally different for a
single reason. While reverse engineering restrictions serve to
prohibit an activity that involves a work that is within the scope of
the copyright grant (and even this prohibition is incomplete, as
noted above), anti-cloning restrictions necessarily implicate and
cover more than can be contained within a patent grant and
potentially any intellectual property grant.
For example, where software source code has been compiled
into machine-readable object code for distribution, the
decompilation of the object code (and thus its unauthorized
copying), in order to reverse engineer attributes, behaviors, and
concepts underlying the expressive elements of the source code, is
allowed by the courts as a fair use of the copyright grant.143 By
requiring a finding of fair use to be legal, the practice necessarily
involves work that is covered by the grant. A prohibition on
reverse engineering merely prevents the licensee from examining
the specific implementations that the licensor has utilized to
achieve the various attributes and behaviors present in the
software. The prohibition alone does not forbid making use of
143

See Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1993); Sony Computer Equipment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that the disassembly of computer code may be a fair use of a
copyrighted work if disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and
functional elements embodied in the work and there is a legitimate reason for
seeking such access).
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independently derived implementations of the various attributes or
behaviors or forbid the development of similar attributes or
behaviors for deployment in similar products.144
This may be contrasted with anti-cloning provisions. These
provisions have a far and deep reach, attempting and claiming to
cover every aspect of a “user experience,” reserving such an
experience to one party or another. This necessarily encompasses
far more than can ever be reached by the traditional regimes of
intellectual property. Indeed, a clear and dangerous reality of anticloning provisions is the extent to which no one actually knows
how far they truly reach.145 Where expressive portions of a piece of
144

i-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. CIV. 02-1951 JRTFLN, 2004 WL
742082 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2004) (“[Any elements of the program] may be
unprotectable because they constitute idea rather than expression, are facts or
processes, are unoriginal or in the public domain, or are subject to the doctrines
of merger or scenes a faire.” (citing Control Data, Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F.
Supp. 1316, 1323 (D. Minn. 1995)).); see also id. at 33 (“The main purpose of a
program is almost always an idea, and thus unprotectable.” (citing Gates Rubber
Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993)).).
145
Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160337, 4041 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013) (“The scope of the Apple patents and HTC products
covered by the HTC Agreement is not entirely clear. This much appears
undisputed: the agreement settled litigations between Apple and HTC that
involved 32 of Apple’s U.S. patents, including the ‘381 and ‘915 patents, see
Updated Rebuttal Expert Report of Michael J. Wagner for New Trial on
Damages, August 26, 2013, 353 (‘Wagner Updated Rebuttal Report’), and the
agreement explicitly does not cover Apple’s design patents, see Article 5.1. But
the parties’ experts do not necessarily agree on whether the agreement also
exempts the ‘381, ‘915, or ‘163 patents, as applied to HTC’s smartphones.
Compare Wagner Updated Rebuttal Report 344 (‘[T]he [HTC Agreement]
explicitly provided a license to [the ‘381 and ‘915] patents, in addition to an
implicit license to the ‘163 Patent.’) with Videotaped Deposition of Julie Davis,
August 26, 2013, at 227 (ECF No. 2573-5) (‘I don’t know if [those patents] are
[included] or are not.’). The reason for the lack of clarity appears to be due to
the agreement’s ‘anti-cloning’ provision. In overly simplistic terms, but
sufficient for current purposes, the anti-cloning provision exempts from HTC’s
license any product for which HTC copied the patented design and related
functionality of an Apple product, regardless of whether HTC intended to copy
that product. See HTC Agreement, Articles 5.1 & 12, Exhibit A. Although the
anti-cloning provision expressly does not exempt pure functionality, such as
‘pinch to zoom,’ from HTC’s license, id., Exhibit A, Apple does not concede
that the HTC Agreement gives HTC a license to the utility patents at issue in the
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software contain non-expressive attributes or behaviors or
functional elements, those elements are considered to be beyond
the scope of a copyright grant. Where functional elements qualify
for patent protection, the environment in which they are utilized
does not factor into whether a patent grant covers the element.
Furthermore, a claim over the user experience for software will
almost certainly rely in some measure on patentable subject matter
whose protection has expired and has entered into the public
domain. Perhaps a software author could argue for a thin copyright
covering the selection and arrangement of various protectable and
non-protectable elements, but choosing not to attempt protection in
this manner and instead relying on provisions prohibiting cloning
clearly expands the scope of whatever intellectual property rights
have been granted and exposes the public to the potential recapture
of intellectual property in the public domain.
Indeed, compared to the prohibition on “examination” to which
was analogized reverse engineering above, anti-cloning provisions
prohibit far more. They prohibit the very use of disclosed
implementations (i.e., the implementations disclosed, as intended
by the patent regime, in the patent application or, potentially, in the
public domain) in developing or producing similar attributes or
behaviors not covered by the patent grant for deployment in
competing products, attributes or behaviors that may be included in
the very disclosure that the licensor ostensibly grants permission to
the licensee to use. The prohibition covers a much larger expanse
than the prohibition of reverse engineering, prohibiting the ability
of a competitor to fairly compete in a very meaningful way, as
opposed to restricting the in-depth examination of a licensor’s
product. As such, restrictions on cloning activities necessarily
implicate works and elements that fall outside of any specific
grants of intellectual property rights, potentially including elements
that may never be subject to the traditional intellectual property
regimes, while restrictions on reverse engineering only affect
activities that necessarily implicate and are covered by the
copyright grant.
retrial, see, e.g., 10/27/2013 Hearing Tr. at 134 (‘How you would apply that
license to this IP is very complicated. It carves out portions of the IP that have
been found to be infringed here.’).”).
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The judiciary’s acceptance of contractual restraints on reverse
engineering has likely been eased by Judge Rader’s assignment of
de minimus damages to breaching the contractual restraint for the
discernment of non-protected code.146 Acceptance is much less
likely to occur, however, where contractual restraints result in wide
swaths of innovation being removed and potential competitors
being prohibited from entering the market without incurring heavy
damages as a result of patent infringement.
D. Anti-Cloning Provisions Should be Found to be Per Se Illegal
and Should Result in Equitable Remedies
Under the doctrine of patent misuse, conduct may be classified
as per se misuse, per se legal, or potential misuse depending on the
competitive effects. Anti-cloning provisions should be considered
to impermissibly broaden the patent grant to cover non-patentable
subject matter and effectively restrain competition in unpatented
products. Without even needing to consider the anticompetitive
effects that the provisions have on the market, this improper
broadening of the patent grant should provide enough of a basis for
courts to find such provisions to be per se misuse—the obvious
anticompetitive effects serving to buttress this determination.
Arguments in favor of the anti-cloning provisions on the
grounds that they may provide some procompetitive benefits can
be easily brushed aside. Whatever the procompetitive benefits are
alleged to be, the anticompetitive effect of allowing an entity with
market power that is able to set the de facto standard in at least
some markets in which it competes (i.e., smartphones) to
effectively remove the possibility of directly competing products
(i.e., Samsung smartphones) by leveraging its patent monopoly
cannot be overcome. Even if this effect could be overcome, the
argument is moot due to the grounding of patent misuse in patent
policy rather than antitrust policy. Patent policy abhors
impermissible expansions of the patent grant, and anti-cloning
provisions are examples of such expansions.
A finding of misuse renders the misused intellectual property
146

Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
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unenforceable. Where courts encounter such provisions, especially
where there is a history of their usage and thus a history of misuse,
courts should order all intellectual property rights involved in any
licensing agreement that contains such a provision to be
unenforceable until the misuse is cured. While other factors will
play into a court’s determination of whether the misuse has been
cured, at a minimum a court should require a party that has
engaged in such misuse to renegotiate all “tainted” licensing
agreements to remove the offending terms and certify to the court
that no agreements currently in force contain the offending terms
in order to demonstrate that they have cured the misuse.
Here, Apple’s use of anti-cloning provisions should constitute
misuse. The presence of the Apple/Microsoft settlement agreement
and the Apple/HTC settlement agreement, paired with Apple’s
insistence that any settlement agreement with Samsung include an
anti-cloning provision, should provide ample evidence of a pattern
of misuse spanning over 15 years. As such, should a court consider
a defense of patent misuse against an infringement claim by Apple,
the court should find Apple’s conduct to have constituted per se
misuse and hold every patent involved in an agreement that
contained or contains any anti-cloning provision to be
unenforceable. At a minimum, the court should require that, in
order for Apple to cure the misuse for any single patent, every
agreement that the patent is involved in must have the offending
provision removed. The anti-cloning provision itself is not
necessarily unenforceable. Rather, the misuse renders the patent
grant itself unenforceable. As such, the severability clause of
Apple’s agreements may147 or may not148 remove the anti-cloning
147

Severability clause of Apple’s agreement in the Apple/HTC settlement
agreement:
Severability. If any portion of this Agreement is found to be
invalid, illegal, or unenforceable for any reason, the remainder
of the Agreement shall continue in full force and, if needed,
the Parties or an appropriate arbitral body shall substitute
suitable provisions having like economic effect and intent.
Apple/HTC Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at 13.5.
148
Severability clause of Apple’s agreement in the Apple/Microsoft
settlement agreement:
Severability. If any term, provision, covenant, or restriction of
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provision automatically, thus potentially requiring Apple to
renegotiate every agreement affecting every patent rendered
unenforceable by its misuse.
This is obviously a sweeping result with the potential to
effectively render most or all of an entity’s intellectual property
unenforceable for a significant amount of time (the time required
to renegotiate all of the offending agreements where the provision
is not automatically severed plus, potentially, time for any
lingering “taint” to disperse). While such a remedy is anything but
subtle, the noxiousness of the anti-cloning provisions is such that it
demands a strong reinvigoration of the equitable remedies
available to the judiciary in policing the appropriate bounds of
patent licensing.
CONCLUSION
Anti-cloning provisions inflict an evil on the market, capturing
non-patentable subject matter within the scope of a patent grant
and exposing those who infringe upon the non-patentable subject
matter to potential liability. This improper broadening of the patent
grant constrains competition in unpatented products, harms
competition, and should be considered by the courts to constitute
per se patent misuse. Where this misuse exists, all intellectual
property that is tainted by the anti-cloning provision should be held
to be unenforceable while agreements that contain the offending
provision are still in force.

this Agreement is held by a court of competent jurisdiction to
be invalid, void or unenforceable, the remainder of the terms,
provisions, covenants, and restrictions of this Agreement shall
remain in full force and effect and shall in no way be affected,
impaired, or invalidated.
Apple/Microsoft Agreement, supra note 10, at 14.7.
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